Representation of War in the Media

Representation of War in the MediaCHAPTER III CASE STUDIESWar is fought with the forget of the g all overnment, competence of the armed forces and the defend of the nationCarl Von Clausewitzthither is no doubt that the global reach and immediacy of the new media communications technologies and the ability to shape some(prenominal) national and international public opinion has made media a major player in limited conflicts. Such developments could be expected to significantly feign the way conflict is reported and make outd by international community. Given the rapid progress and far reaching advances in communications over recent years, fall off engagement with the media acts as a force multiplier for the commander on ground to achieve a more comprehensive success. On the other hand, the wild media engagement leads to loss of operational security and makes the task of the military commander much more difficult.The media representation of wars has significantly changed over w ork years. Previously universe just an instrument of coverage and propaganda, now media are considered a competent weapon. The war of real objects is partially being replaced by the war of pictures and sounds, information war1. today we shall examine few significant national and international conflicts, where the media extensively covered these operations by the Armed Forces. Some were a success story darn others left much to be desired form the way the Armed Forces engage the media.The Gulf WarControl of the media during the Gulf war followed the pattern that was found in the Falklands and refined in Grenada and Panama2. The pattern included secrecy in planning, demonisation of the enemy, exploitation of the media to enlist national and international conduct, and the exclusion of the media during the initial phases of the operation3. The solvent news vacuum was filled by officialcoverage favourable to the military. Later criticisms were stonewalled.In the Gulf, the media wer e excluded from the planning stages of the initial deployment and the deliberations leading to the change of war aims from that of the demurrer of Saudi Arabia to offensive action in Kuwait. The demonisation of Saddam Hussein was used to rally national as headspring as international support and the media was immediately co-opted into these tasks4. The Gulf also demonstrated the familiar pattern of exclusion of the media from the early action, when both the military and the administration were most vulnerable5.Before the commencement of the hostilities, regular army set up the Joint Information Bureau to handle the media from a base in Dhahran. Journalists were formed into pools or Media Reporting Teams (MRTs).Guidelines were instituted, concurrent with the arrival of the premier(prenominal) pool of reporters6. Subsequent guidelines gave detailed instructions how the information could be gathered. All interviews could be conducted whole in the presence of a military escort, all reports, photos and videos had to be cleared by a security review system before transmission.Beyond these measures, however, the Gulf campaign lent itself to complete media management through sacrosanct control over the means of communication, transport and access. So powerful was this weapons system that there was no need for actual censorship7. Censorship was achieved primarily through defence of access and delay in transmission, backed a blanket decision non to allow media access to any event that was a strictly controlled. This was head start by a flow of favourable military sourced information to fill the vacuum created by media restriction. Material ranged from information provided at carefully controlled briefings which bypassed journalists on the spot. The combination of credibility afforded by the briefings and novelty of the new weaponry was enough to satisfy audiences8.The realities of war and any real analysis were foregone in favour of a politicallyacceptable, san itised war which showed nothing but success. It was evident too thatthe military used the media not whole to present its own policies in the shell possible light, but to deceive and misinform the Iraqis.Both the administration and the military clearly benefited from this control. CNNs coverage of the 1991 Gulf War, when it became the worlds only instant chronicler of a major conflict, seemed only to confirm the formidable role played by Western news agencies in covering and framing international events. The impact of this kind of media coverage has been dubbed the CNN effect, referring to the astray available round-the-clock broadcasts of the Cable News Network9. Indeed, by the mid 1990s, some scholars and certain policymakers had come to the conclusion that CNN in particular was having a measurable impact on the way governments conduct world politics.This proactive engagement of media by the Pentagon ensured that the military remains immune from scrutiny but also garners the vo ter benefits for the politicians. The only caution is that this form of media containment or partial exclusion can only work for a limited period. If, as in Vietnam and as may well engender happened in the Gulf, such a limited conflict becomes protracted and involves high levels of casualties, then the ascendancy of the military may be challenged and broken as the global media brings to bear the full weight of its capacity for independent news gathering and communications.The 1991 Gulf war was the first televised war of the century wherein pictures of the night toss away lit up with firing of weapons. Operation Desert Storm was the most bulkyly and most swiftly reported war in history. In gain to being called the first CNN War this war also marked a turning point for the Americans view of that relationship. US demonstrated volition and military potential to influence developing world in consonance of her policies.10 The world saw the exist footage of the 1991 Gulf war. CNN act ivities during the war were a classic guinea pig of the role that civil broadcasts and journalists can play in any future war. Media can be allowed selective access with a view to influencing the international opinion. The media enjoys the support of high technology equipment and access to credible media outlets. The CNN broadcasts provided useful inputs to put into operation diplomatic damage limitation operations to counter the fallout of adverse reports. The exemplification at hand is the demonstration of her will and the military potential by the USA in influencing the world opinion, including engaging the media11.The first Iraqi war was only covered by the media and the general opinion was that the media was focussing all their attention on the wars victory and retreating troops. Very few journalists looked after the Arabian people in fact the Iraqi refugee problem was simply overlooked. In general, the media was in truth supportive of the American troops in the Persian Gul f. Though the account was positive, the coverage did not tell the absolute truth on the battle field. Journalists were more or less welcomed by the battalion commanders. The army was silent to embedding the media, while the Marine army corps was proactive and welcomed media attention. Public satisfaction with press coverage can be largely attributed to the increasing media savvy of the military leadership, who were able to successfully use news coverage to enhance the militarys image and win public support for its operations. General Schwarzkopf was a master at these press briefings. He examine the importance of the briefings and prepared himself mentally. He decided not to repeat the mistake made in Grenada, where the relations between media and the military had been eroded to an appalling state12.Kargil A Water Shed for Indian MediaThe Kargil conflict was Indias first real war of the information age and it was significant for the impact and the influence of the mass media on t he public opinion of both the nation states13. During this operation, both the military and the media were interacting for the very first time in the backdrop of the technological advances made in the last two three decades or so. The Kargil news stories and war footage were often telecast live on the TV, while many websites provided in-depth analysis of the war. This conflict became the first live war in South Asia14. The Indian Army tried to implement the pool methodology of the Gulf war after consulting some reputed and esteemed media persons. on that point were daily briefings in Delhi through the operational staff and journalists were allowed to enter the war zone15. The site tours were discontinued after some time and media persons got total freedom to can around on their own except where their lives could be in danger. But unlike the Gulf war, there was to be no censoring of media reports and there was to be no deviation from the truth16. The military and the media did not indulge in any deliberate disinformation drive. But they effectively exposed Pakistans lies and disinformation tactics.The media for once highlighted defence requirements of weaponry and ammunition which otherwise do not get any entailment for reporting in the normal sequence of events.17. The Kargil War, also brought into focus the significance of both the print and the electronic media18. The nation made a very clever use of the Internet and dedicated an exclusive Website www.vijayinkargil.com to show case the heroics of the Indian Army. Trained PR officers manned chat sites on the web to establish a real time inter face with the youths of the country for possibly the very first time.Television was able to invade the living rooms of the people to shape public opinion. The war received a human face because of the wide scale coverage of the war by the news channels like Aaj Tak, Zee News and NDTV Network. The media both Indian and overseas was predominantly compassionate to the In dian cause, with editorials in newspapers based in the west and other neutral countries observing that our western adversary was in principal answerable for the conflict19. Some analysts believe that Indian media, which was both larger in number and more credible, may have acted as a force multiplier for the Indian military operation in Kargil20 and served as a morale booster. As the fighting intensified, the Pakistani version of events found little backing on the world stage. This helped India gain valuable diplomatic recognition for its position.Media reportage on Kargil converged around a single dramatic image of a nation at war. In the initial phase, news coverage was restrained on the logic of operational security. The Army permitted first media coverage on 15 May 1999. In Jun 1999, travel permits of press personnel were turned again quoting compromise of security. The failure of understanding was due to incorrect handling of media by army as well as character and content of r eportage. thither was a tendency to trivialise and sensationalise news by many sections of media. The semantics of reportage of certain events like return of six tortured bodies, led to a proliferation of enlarged stories.However, media did not act as the force multiplier throughout. At crucial junctures, the over ecstatic media reported the crucial attack plans of the Indian army on the news in advance. This gave the all important operational intelligence to the adversary. The glaring example of this was the attack on tiger Hill, where in after capture of Tiger Hill, the captured Pakistani troops revealed that they received the inputs about the Indian Armys plans through the news channels. Also the telecast at times showed the location of the gas gun bases, deployment areas and the logistic installations which was then suitably interpreted by the enemy to bring out effective fire on these locations.Mumbai Terrorist Attacks of 26/11Medias reporting of terrorist activities is fast becoming critical in todays scenario when no country is left untouched by terrorism. War on terrorism is a test for the Indian media. How much should be broadcast, whether broadcast of terrorist actions amounts to glorifying terrorism and violence and whether it incites people, creates new recruits and gives publicity to terrorists who seek to grab world attention are topics of debate across nations in the post 9/11 world. Similar debates have begun in India, more so after 26/11 Mumbai attacks.The well interrelated terror attack on Mumbai brings about essential lessons, both for the media as well as the Armed forces. The news media with a lack of understanding of where the speciality can reach in such a situation, reported the move of National Security Guard (NSG) from Delhi to Mumbai being declared by the Home Minister21. There is increasing questioning of the medias conduct in the face of such attacks and more so after the live telecast of the 60 hour long Mumbai attacks. refer over the way many aspects of its operations got jeopardized due to live images being broadcast by TV during the 6- hour siege, the National Security Guard (NSG) touch for restrictions on media coverage wherever its commandos are engaged to combat22.The case in point is the way NSGs operations at Nariman House were broadcast live. Questions were raised over the way Havaldar Gajender Singh fell to a terrorists bullet at Nariman House. As per the narration of incidents by an NSG commando TV broadcasted our commandoes landing from a helicopter on the capital over Nariman House. By the time our men landed and started taking positions, the terrorists were already waiting for us and opened fire23.In contrast the operations at Oberoi could be conducted more smoothly since TV channels were kept beyond a one-kilometer radius24. This zone was put under virtual curfew with no access allowed to television crews. The operations there took the least time, just under 30 hours, as compared to the other two places. As per NSG officials while terrorists holed up inside probably did not have access to live TV images on the second and third day of operations, they still had phones and were probably getting instructions from people watching those live images on TV. The media in turn can question the NSG that was there any spokesman of NSG to guide the media? The media showed what they saw. Can you blame them for showing what was happening?1 Gulf War Was A faultless Television War http//www.ukessays.com/essays/media/gulf-war-was-a-perfect-television-war-media-essay.php2 Young and Jesser, Loc cit, pp 280-2813 Ibid, pp 1764 Ibid5 Ibid, pp1896 Ibid7 Ibid8 Aradhana Sharma, Journalism in Democracies during times of war Examining the Role of Indian and US Media, Jamia Milia Islamia, New Delhi 20109The CNN Effect Strategic Enabler or functional Risk? Margaret H. Belknap http//strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/02autumn/belknap.htm10 Brig VK Nair,VSM,Retd. War in the Gulf Lessons For The Third World, Lancer Papers, pp 106.11 Ibid12 Vice Admiral J Metcalfe, The Press and the Grenada 1983, Franc Cass Co. Ltd, London pp 16813 Operation Vijay 1999 Victory Over Pak Treachery break J P Singh, Retd News Bharti English 25 Jul 201414 Kargil War Wikipedia, online http//www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/kargil_war.15 Kargil War Wikipedia, online http//www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/kargil_war16 Ibid.17 Ibid.18 Aradhana Sharma, Journalism in Democracies during times of war Examining the Role of Indian and US Media, Jamia Milia Islamia, New Delhi 201019Article titled The Significance of the Kargil Crisis pp18-19, RAND Publications http//www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1450/MR1450.ch2.pdf20 Ibid21 Rahul K Bhonsle, Mumbai 26/11- Security Imperatives for the Future, New Delhi Vij Books (India) Pvt Ltd pp 50-5122 Media has Blood of NSG Commandoes http//nomadmolouges.blogspot.in/2008/12/media-has-blood-of-nsg-commando.html23 Ibid24 Indian Media And War maturity date Essay http//www.ukessays.com/essays/media/indian-media-and-war-maturity-media-essay.php